The Rise of the Network Society: With a New Preface, Volume I, Second edition With a new preface

Published Online: 27 JAN 2010 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/book/10.1002/9781444319514

The Information Age

Economy, Society, and Culture

Volume I

The Rise of the Network Society

‘‘We live today in a period of intense and puzzling transformation, signalling perhaps a move beyond the industrial era altogether. Yet where are the great sociological works that chart this transition? Hence the importance of Manuel Castells’ multivolume work, in which he seeks to chart the social and economic dynamics of the information age . . . [It] is bound to be a major reference source for years to come.’’ (Anthony Giddens, The Times Higher Education Supplement)

‘‘A brief review cannot do it justice. No other scholar has approached the subject of the information age in as engaging and innovative a way as this author. Strongly recommended for academic libraries.’’ (Choice)

A little over a decade since its first publication, the hypotheses set out in Manuel Castells’ groundbreaking trilogy have largely been verified. In a substantial new preface to the first volume in the series, Castells demon- strates, in the light of major world trends, how the network society has now fully risen on a global scale.

The book discusses how the global economy is now characterized by the almost instantaneous flow and exchange of information, capital, and cultural communication. These flows order and condition both consumption and production. The networks themselves reflect and create distinctive cultures. Both they and the traffic they carry are largely outside national regulation. Our dependence on the new modes of informational flow gives to those in a position to control them enormous power to control us. The main political arena is now the media, and the media are not politically answerable.

Based on research in the USA, Asia, Latin America, and Europe, Castells formulates a systematic theory of the information society and details the new social and economic developments brought by the Internet and the ‘‘new economy.’’

The Rise of the Network Society, Second edition With a new preface Manuel Castells © 2010 Manuel Castells. ISBN: 978-1-405-19686-4

Table of Contents for Volumes II and III of Manuel Castells’ The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture

Volume II: The Power of Identity

Our World, our Lives

1Communal Heavens: Identity and Meaning in the Network Society

2The Other Face of the Earth: Social Movements against the New Global Order

3The Greening of the Self: The Environmental Movement

4The End of Patriarchalism: Social Movements, Family, and Sexu- ality in the Information Age

5Globalization, Identification, and the State: A Powerless State or a Network State?

6Informational Politics and the Crisis of Democracy

Conclusion: Social Change in the Network Society

Volume III: End of Millennium

A Time of Change

1The Crisis of Industrial Statism and the Collapse of the Soviet Union

2The Rise of the Fourth World: Informational Capitalism, Poverty, and Social Exclusion

3The Perverse Connection: the Global Criminal Economy

4Development and Crisis in the Asian Pacific: Globalization and the State

5The Unification of Europe: Globalization, Identity, and the Net- work State

Conclusion: Making Sense of our World

This second edition with a new preface first published 2010

#2010 Manuel Castells

Edition history: Blackwell Publishing Ltd (1e, 1996), Blackwell Publishing Ltd (2e, 2000)

Blackwell Publishing was acquired by John Wiley & Sons in February 2007. Blackwell’s publishing program has been merged with Wiley’s global Scientific, Technical, and Medical business to form Wiley-Blackwell.

Registered Office

John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, United Kingdom

Editorial Offices

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA

9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK

The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK

For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell.

The right of Manuel Castells to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.

Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Castells, Manuel, 1942–

The rise of the network society / Manuel Castells. – 2nd ed., with a new pref. p. cm. – (Information age ; v. 1)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4051-9686-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Information technology–Economic aspects. 2. Information society. 3. Information networks. 4. Technology and civilization. I. Title.

HC79.I55C373 2010 303.48’33–dc22

2009009312

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Set in 10.5/12 Sabon by SPi Publisher Services Ltd, Pondicherry, India Printed in Singapore

01 2010

For Emma Kiselyova-Castells,

without whose love, work, and support

this book would not exist

Contents

List of Figures	xii
List of Tables	xiv
Preface to the 2010 Edition of The Rise of the Network Society	xvii
Acknowledgments 2000	xlv
Acknowledgments 1996	lv
Prologue: the Net and the Self	1
Technology, Society, and Historical Change	5
Informationalism, Industrialism, Capitalism, Statism:
Modes of Development and Modes of Production	13
Informationalism and capitalist perestroika	18
The Self in the Informational Society	21
A Word on Method	25
1 The Information Technology Revolution	28
Which Revolution?	28
Lessons from the Industrial Revolution	33
The Historical Sequence of the Information Technology
Revolution	38
Micro-engineering macro-changes: electronics and	39
information
The creation of the Internet	45

CONTENTS	ix
From mass production to flexible production	166
Small business and the crisis of the large corporation:	167
myth and reality
“Toyotism”: management–worker cooperation,
multifunctional labor, total quality control, and	169
reduction of uncertainty
Inter-firm networking	172
Corporate strategic alliances	174
The horizontal corporation and global business	176
networks
The crisis of the vertical corporation model and the rise	178
of business networks
Networking the networks: the Cisco model	180
Information Technology and the Network Enterprise	184
Culture, Institutions, and Economic Organization: East
Asian Business Networks	188
A typology of East Asian business networks	189
Japan	190
Korea	191
China	193
Culture, organizations, and institutions: Asian business	195
networks and the developmental state
Multinational Enterprises, Transnational Corporations,
and International Networks	206
The Spirit of Informationalism	210
4 The Transformation of Work and Employment:
Networkers, Jobless, and Flex-timers	216
The Historical Evolution of Employment and
Occupational Structure in Advanced Capitalist
Countries: the G-7, 1920–2005	217
Post-industrialism, the service economy, and the	218
informational society
The transformation of employment structure,	224
1920–1970 and 1970–1990
The new occupational structure	232
The maturing of the informational society:
employment projections into the twenty-first	237
century
Summing up: the evolution of employment structure
and its implications for a comparative analysis of	243
the informational society

x	CONTENTS
	Is There a Global Labor Force?	247
	The Work Process in the Informational Paradigm	255
	The Effects of Information Technology on Employment:
	Toward a Jobless Society?	267
	Work and the Informational Divide: Flex-timers	281
	Information Technology and the Restructuring of
	Capital–Labor Relations: Social Dualism or
	Fragmented Societies?	296
	Appendix A: Statistical Tables for Chapter 4	303
	Appendix B: Methodological Note and Statistical
	References	338

5The Culture of Real Virtuality: the Integration of Electronic Communication, the End of the Mass

Audience, and the Rise of Interactive Networks	355
From the Gutenberg Galaxy to the McLuhan Galaxy: the
Rise of Mass Media Culture	358
The New Media and the Diversification of Mass Audience	365
Computer-mediated Communication, Institutional
Control, Social Networks, and Virtual Communities	371
The Minitel story: l’état et l’amour	372
The Internet constellation	375
The interactive society	385
The Grand Fusion: Multimedia as Symbolic Environment	394
The Culture of Real Virtuality	403
6 The Space of Flows	407
Advanced Services, Information Flows, and the Global
City	409
The New Industrial Space	417
Everyday Life in the Electronic Cottage: the End of Cities?	424
The Transformation of Urban Form: the Informational
City	429
America’s last suburban frontier	429
The fading charm of European cities	431
Third millennium urbanization: mega-cities	434
The Social Theory of Space and the Theory of the Space
of Flows	440
The Architecture of the End of History	448
Space of Flows and Space of Places	453

CONTENTS	xi
7 The Edge of Forever: Timeless Time	460
Time, History, and Society	461
Time as the Source of Value: the Global Casino	465
Flex-time and the Network Enterprise	467
The Shrinking and Twisting of Life Working Time	468
The Blurring of the Life-cycle: Toward Social Arrhythmia?	475
Death Denied	481
Instant Wars	484
Virtual Time	491
Time, Space, and Society: the Edge of Forever	494
Conclusion: the Network Society	500
Summary of the Contents of Volumes II and III	510
Bibliography	512
Index	566

Figures

2.1 Productivity growth in the United States, 1995–1999

91

2.2Estimate of evolution of productivity in the United

States, 1972–1999	93
2.3 Growth in trade and capital flows, 1970–1995	107

2.4Goods in international trade by level of technological

	intensity, 1976/1996	108
2.5	Foreign direct investment	117
2.6	Cross-border mergers and acquisitions, 1992–1997	118
2.7	Export shares	133

2.8Share of growth from high-tech sector in the United

States, 1986–1998	149
2.9 Declining dividends payments	157

4.1Percentage of the United States’ population that is

foreign-born, 1900–1994

249

4.2Total fertility rates for nationals and foreigners in

selected OECD countries	250
4.3 Index of employment growth by region, 1973–1999	268

4.4Part-time workers in employed labor force in

OECD countries, 1983–1998

283

4.5Self-employed workers in employed labor force in

OECD countries, 1983–1993

284

4.6Temporary workers in employed labor force in

OECD countries, 1983–1997

284

4.7Non-standard forms of employment in employed

labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1994

285

4.8Employment in the temporary help industry in the

United States, 1982–1997

287

4.9Percentage of working-age Californians employed in

“traditional” jobs, 1999

288

FIGURES

xiii

4.10Distribution of working-age Californians by “traditional” job status and length of tenure in the

job, 1999	288
4.11 The Japanese labor market in the postwar period	294

4.12Annual growth of productivity, employment, and

earnings in OECD countries, 1984–1998	301
5.1 Media sales in 1998 for major media groups	370

5.2Strategic alliances between media groups in Europe,

1999	371
5.3 Internet hosts, 1989–2006	376

5.4Internet CONE and country code domain names by

city worldwide, July 1999

378

5.5Internet CONE and country code domain names by

city in North America, July 1999

379

5.6Internet CONE and country code domain names by

city in Europe, July 1999

380

5.7Internet CONE and country code domain names by

city in Asia, July 1999

381

6.1Largest absolute growth in information flows, 1982

and 1990

412

6.2Exports of information from the United States to

major world regions and centers

413

6.3System of relationships between the characteristics of information technology manufacturing and the

industry’s spatial pattern

420

6.4The world’s largest urban agglomerations (>10 million

inhabitants in 1992)

435

6.5Diagrammatic representation of major nodes and links

	in the urban region of the Pearl River Delta	437
6.6	Downtown Kaoshiung	450
6.7	The entrance hall of Barcelona airport	451
6.8	The waiting room at D.E. Shaw and Company	452
6.9	Belleville, 1999	454
6.10 Las Ramblas, Barcelona, 1999		455
6.11 Barcelona: Paseo de Gracia		456
6.12 Irvine, California: business complex		457

7.1Labor force participation rate (%) for men 55–64

years old in eight countries, 1970–1998

474

7.2Ratio of hospitalized deaths to total deaths (%), by

year, 1947–1987, in Japan

483

7.3War deaths relative to world population, by decade,

1720–2000

488

Tables

2.1	Productivity rate: growth rates of output per worker	81
2.2	Productivity in the business sector	82
2.3	Evolution of the productivity of business sectors	86

2.4Evolution of productivity in sectors not open to free

trade

87

2.5Evolution of US productivity by industrial sectors and

periods

93

2.6Cross-border transactions in bonds and equities,

1970–1996

102

2.7Foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of total

assets and liabilities of commercial banks for selected
countries, 1960–1997	103
2.8 Direction of world exports, 1965–1995	109

2.9Parent corporations and foreign affiliates by area and

country	119
2.10 Stocks valuation, 1995–1999	158

4.1United States: percentage distribution of employment

by industrial sector and intermediate industry group,
1920–1991	304

4.2Japan: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group,

1920–1990

306

4.3Germany: percentage distribution of employment by

industrial sector and intermediate industry group,
1925–1987	308

4.4France: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group,

1921–1989

310

TABLES

xv

4.5Italy: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group,

1921–1990

312

4.6United Kingdom: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate

industry group, 1921–1992

314

4.7Canada: percentage distribution of employment by industrial sector and intermediate industry group,

1921–1992

316

4.8United States: employment statistics by industry,

	1920–1991	318
4.9 Japan: employment statistics by industry, 1920–1990		319
4.10	Germany: employment statistics by industry,
	1925–1987	320
4.11	France: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1989	321
4.12	Italy: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1990	322

4.13United Kingdom: employment statistics by industry,

	1921–1990	323
4.14	Canada: employment statistics by industry, 1921–1992	324
4.15	Occupational structure of selected countries	325

4.16United States: percentage distribution of employment

by occupation, 1960–1991

326

4.17Japan: percentage distribution of employment by

occupation, 1955–1990

327

4.18Germany: percentage distribution of employment by

occupation, 1976–1989

328

4.19France: percentage distribution of employment by

occupation, 1982–1989

328

4.20Great Britain: percentage distribution of employment

by occupation, 1961–1990

329

4.21Canada: percentage distribution of employment by

occupation, 1950–1992

329

4.22Foreign resident population in Western Europe,

1950–1990

330

4.23Employment in manufacturing by major countries

and regions, 1970–1997

331

4.24Employment shares by industry/occupation and

ethnic/gender group of all workers in the United
States, 1960–1998	332

4.25Information technology spending per worker (1987–1994), employment growth (1987–1994),

and unemployment rate (1995) by country

333

xvi

TABLES

4.26Main telephone lines per employee (1986 and 1993)

and Internet hosts per 1,000 population (January 1996)

by country

334

4.27Men’s and women’s employment ratios, 15–64 years

old, 1973–1998

335

4.28Percentage of standard workers in the chuki koyo

system of Japanese firms

336

4.29Concentration of stock ownership by income level in

	the United States, 1995	337
7.1	Annual hours worked per person, 1870–1979	469
7.2	Potential lifelong working hours, 1950–1985	469
7.3	Duration and reduction of working time, 1970–1987	471

7.4Principal demographic characteristics by main regions

of the world, 1970–1995

477

7.5Total fertility rates of some industrialized countries,

1901–1985

478

7.6First live births per 1,000 women by age group of mother (30–49 years) and by race in the United

States, 1960 and 1990

479

7.7Comparisons of infant mortality rates, selected

countries, 1990–1995 (estimates)

496

Preface to the 2010

Edition of The Rise of the

Network Society

We live in confusing times, as is often the case in periods of historical transition between different forms of society. This is because the intellectual categories that we use to understand what happens around us have been coined in different circumstances, and can hardly grasp what is new by referring to the past. I contend that around the end of the second millennium of the common era a number of major social, technological, economic, and cultural transformations came together to give rise to a new form of society, the network society, whose analysis is proposed in this volume.

The urgency for a new approach to understanding the kind of economy, culture, and society in which we live is heightened by the crises and conflicts that have characterized the first decade of the twenty-first century. The global financial crisis; the upheaval in busi- ness and labor markets resulting from a new international division of labor; the unstoppable growth of the global criminal economy; the social and cultural exclusion of large segments of the population of the planet from the global networks that accumulate knowledge, wealth, and power; the backlash of the disaffected in the form of religious fundamentalism; the rekindling of national, ethnic, and territorial cleavages, ushering in the negation of the other, and thus the widespread resort to violence as a way of protest and domination; the environmental crisis epitomized by climate change; the growing incapacity of political institutions based on the nation-state to handle global problems and local demands: these are all diverse expressions of a process of multidimensional, structural change that takes place in the midst of agony and uncertainty. These are indeed troubled times.

xviii

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

The sense of disorientation is compounded by radical changes in the realm of communication, derived from the revolution in commu- nication technologies. The shift from traditional mass media to a system of horizontal communication networks organized around the Internet and wireless communication has introduced a multiplicity of communication patterns at the source of a fundamental cultural transformation, as virtuality becomes an essential dimension of our reality. The constitution of a new culture based on multimodal com- munication and digital information processing creates a generational divide between those born before the Internet Age (1969) and those who grew up being digital.

These are among the themes treated in the trilogy of which this book is the first volume, published in 1996 (1st edition) and 2000 (2nd edition). The book did not contain any predictions, as I always kept my distance, as a researcher, from the dubious ventures of futurology. But I identified a number of trends that were already present and observable in the last two decades of the first century, and I tried to make sense of their meaning by using standard social science procedures. The result was the discovery of a new social structure in the making, which I conceptualized as the network society because it is made of networks in all the key dimensions of social organization and social practice. Moreover, while networks are an old form of organization in the human experience, digital network- ing technologies, characteristic of the Information Age, powered social and organizational networks in ways that allowed their endless expansion and reconfiguration, overcoming the traditional limita- tions of networking forms of organization to manage complexity beyond a certain size of the network. Because networks do not stop at the border of the nation-state, the network society constituted itself as a global system, ushering in the new form of globalization char- acteristic of our time. However, while everything and everybody on the planet felt the effects of this new social structure, global networks included some people and territories while excluding others, so indu- cing a geography of social, economic, and technological inequality. In a parallel development, social movements and geopolitical strategies became largely global so as to act on the global sources of power, while the institutions of the nation-state inherited from the Modern Age and from the industrial society gradually lost their capacity to control and regulate global flows of wealth and information. The historical irony is that nation-states were among the most active agents of globalization as they tried to ride the tiger of unfettered markets and free flows of capital and technology for their own benefit.

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xix

By studying empirically the contours of these social and organiza- tional arrangements on a global scale, I ended up with a series of specific analyses on different dimensions of the network society that appeared to be coherent, so that together they provided a canvas of interpretation of events and trends that at first sight seemed to be disjointed.

Thus, while this volume, and this trilogy, does not present a formal, systematic theory of society, it proposes new concepts and a new theoretical perspective to understand the trends that characterize the structure and dynamics of our societies in the world of the twenty- first century.

The relevance of a social theory, beyond the empirical body of evidence gathered to support specific arguments, ultimately comes from its capacity to explain social evolution, either in society at large or in certain dimensions of society. Or, at least, to yield a more fruitful interpretation than alternative analytical frameworks used to study the determinants and consequences of human action in the space and time of the analysis. Seen from this perspective, the first decade of the twenty-first century offers a privileged terrain of obser- vation to gauge the explanatory value of the grounded hypotheses put forward in the pages of this book more than 10 years ago. Again, this is not to verify predictions, since there were none, but to evaluate how accurate was the early identification of major social trends whose development has constituted the fabric of our lives in this historical period. Not so much to vindicate the author of the analysis (he does not feel any such need) as to make further use of the conceptual tools that provided a synthetic view of the process of transformation of our world. Or else to discard those concepts that were of little help in understanding our prospects, dramas, and dilemmas.

Let me review some of the key developments of the last decade, relating them to the analyses presented in this book. I will focus on those trends that refer to the structural analysis offered in this volume, leaving to the new prefaces of volumes II and III the task of proceed- ing with a similar operation in relationship to the themes treated in those volumes.

I

The global financial crisis that exploded towards the end of 2008 and sent the global economy into a tail spin was the direct consequence of the specific dynamics of this global economy, as analyzed in chapter 2 of this volume. It resulted from the combination of six factors. First, the technological transformation of finance that provided the basis for

xx	PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

the constitution of a global financial market around global computer networks, and equipped financial institutions with computational capacity to operate advanced mathematical models. These models were deemed to be capable of managing the increasing complexity of the financial system, operating globally interdependent financial mar- kets through electronic transactions effected at lightning speed. Sec- ond, the liberalization and deregulation of financial markets and financial institutions, allowing the quasi-free flow of capital across the world, and overwhelming the regulatory capacity of national reg- ulators. Third, the securitization of every economic organization, activity, or asset, making financial valuation the paramount standard to assess the value of firms, governments, and even entire economies. Furthermore new financial technologies made possible the invention of numerous exotic financial products, as derivatives, futures, options, and securitized insurance (such as credit default swaps) became increasingly complex and intertwined, ultimately virtualizing capital and eliminating any semblance of transparency in the markets so that accounting procedures became meaningless. Fourth, the imbalance between capital accumulation in newly industrializing countries, such as China and oil-producing countries, and capital borrowing in the richest economies, such as the United States, led to a wave of adventur- ous lending to a crowd of consumers used to living on the edge of debt, exposing the lenders far beyond their financial capabilities. Fifth, because financial markets only partially function according to the logic of supply and demand, and are largely shaped by ‘‘information turbulences’’, as analyzed in this volume, the mortgage crisis that started in 2007 in the United States after the bursting of the real-estate bubble reverberated throughout the global financial system. Indeed, while a similar real-estate crash in Japan in the early 1990s had severe effects on the Japanese economy, its impact was limited on the rest of the world because of the much more limited interpenetration of securities and financial markets. Last, but not least, the lack of proper supervision in securities trading and financial practices enabled daring brokers to pump up the economy and their personal bonuses through increasingly risky lending practices.

The paradox is that the crisis was brewed in the cauldrons of the new economy, an economy defined by a substantial surge in produc- tivity as the result of technological innovation, networking, and higher education levels in the work force, as analyzed in chapters 2 and 3 of this volume, and as I observed later on during the 2000s in other works. Indeed, focusing on the United States, where the crisis first started, between 1998 and 2008 cumulative productivity growth reached almost 30 percent. However, because of shortsighted

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION	xxi
and greedy management policies, real wages increased only	by

2 percent over the decade, and in fact weekly earnings of college- educated workers fell by 6 percent between 2003 and 2008. And yet, real-estate prices soared during the 2000s and lending institutions fed the frenzy by providing mortgages, ultimately backed by Federal institutions, to the same workers whose wages were stagnant or diminishing. The notion was that productivity increases would ulti- mately catch up with wages as the benefits of growth would trickle down. It never happened because financial companies and realtors reaped the benefits of the productive economy, inducing an unsustain- able bubble. The financial services industry’s share of profits increased from 10 percent in the 1980s to 40 percent in 2007, and the value of its shares from 6 percent to 23 percent, while the industry only accounts for 5 percent of private-sector employment. In short, the very real benefits of the new economy were appropriated in the securities market and used to generate a much greater mass of virtual capital that multiplied its value by lending it to a multitude of avid consumers/borrowers. Moreover, the expansion of the global econ- omy, with the rise of China, India, Russia, Brazil, and other indus- trializing economies to the forefront of capitalist growth, increased the risk of financial collapse by lending the capital accumulated in these economies to the United States and other markets in the world, so as to sustain the solvency and imports capability of these econo- mies while taking advantage of favorable lending rates. The massive military spending by the US government to fund its adventure in Iraq was also financed through debt, to the point that Asian countries now hold a large share of US Treasury Bonds, intertwining the Asian Pacific and US fiscal policy in a decisive manner. While inflation was kept relatively in check throughout the OECD because of sig- nificant productivity growth, as proposed in my analysis, there was a growing gap between the scale of the lending and the ability of both consumers and institutions to repay what they borrowed. Household debt of disposable income in the United States grew from 3 percent in 1998 to 130 percent in 2008. As a result, prime mortgage delinquen- cies as a percentage of loans increased from 2.5 percent in 1998 to 118 percent in 2008.

Yet, no one could do much about it because the global financial market had escaped the control of any investor, government, or regulatory agency. It had become what in this volume I called a ‘‘global automaton’’ imposing its logic over the economy and society at large, including over its own creators. And so, a financial crisis of unprecedented proportions unfolds around the world at the time of writing, dramatically ending the myth of the self-regulated market,

xxii	PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

calling into question the relevance of some mainstream economic theories, and sending governments and business into a frantic scram- ble to tame the wild automaton that went into reverse and devoured tens of thousands of jobs (meaning family lives) on a daily basis. There is an urgent search for stabilizing remedies, but I fear that by looking for solutions in the formulas of Economics 101, we will be at a loss in the dark world resulting from the failure to regulate a new kind of economy under new technological conditions. This is why investigating the networked structure of our global, networked econ- omy may help to design strategies and policies adapted to the realities of our time.

II

Work and employment have been transformed. But in contrast to the dystopias and utopias foreseen by prophets of doom or evangelists of a new economic age, the relationship between technology and the quantity and quality of jobs has followed the complex pattern of interaction outlined in chapter 4 of this volume. Overall, and in line with historical experience of earlier technological revolutions, tech- nological change has not destroyed employment in aggregation, since some occupations have been phased out and others have been induced in greater numbers. In general terms, the occupational profile of the labor force has been enhanced in terms of required skills and educa- tional level. On the other hand, by globalizing the process of produc- tion of goods and services, thousands of jobs, particularly in manufacturing, have been eliminated in advanced economies either by automation or by relocation to newly industrialized countries. Accordingly, hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs have been created in these locations so that, on balance, there are more manufacturing jobs than ever in the planet at large. Yet, this job creation and the increased education of the labor force has not resulted in a sustained improvement of living standards in the indus- trialized world. This is because the level of compensation for the majority of workers has not followed the growth of productivity and profits, while the provision of social services, and particularly of health, has been hampered by skyrocketing costs in health care and limitation of social benefits in the private sector. Only the massive entry of women in the labor force has prevented a decline in the standards of living for the majority of households. This feminization of the labor force has substantially affected the economic foundations of patriarchalism and has opened the way for the rise of woman

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxiii

consciousness documented in the second volume of my trilogy and in some of my recent writings. Immigration continues to play a signifi- cant role in economies and societies around the world, as labor gravitates toward job opportunities. It results in growing multiethni- city and multiculturalism almost everywhere. Globalization also changes the labor markets and places multiculturalism at the fore- front of social dynamics. However, as documented in this volume, immigration is not as pervasive a phenomenon as it is usually per- ceived by native populations that often feel ‘‘invaded’’. While there are almost 250 million migrants in the world, this is a fraction of the global labor force, and affects different countries in different propor- tions. Yet, the concentration of immigrants in the core of major metropolitan areas in the world accrues their visibility and potential for social tensions. More often than not the growing multiethnicity of societies everywhere is confused with immigration. In fact, immigra- tion is increasing, in spite of the rise of unemployment and heightened border controls, because the uneven development of an interdepen- dent world and the networks of connectivity between societies (including the Internet) offer greater possibilities for the expansion of ‘‘transnationalism from below’’ in the terminology of some analysts of the new immigration.

The main trends of the new labor structure observed in the last decade have taken place along the lines identified in chapter 4 of this book. These are, on the one hand, the growing flexibility of labor, that is the reduction of the proportion of the labor force with long-term employment and a predictable career path, as new generations, the majority of whom are hired for their flexibility, replace an old labor force entitled to job security in large-scale firms. Business consultants and service entrepreneurs have replaced automobile workers and insurance underwriters. On the other hand, there has been a parallel growth of highly educated occupations and low-skill jobs, with very different bargaining power in the labor market. Exaggerating the terminology to capture the imagination of the reader, I labeled these two types of workers ‘‘self-programmable labor’’ and ‘‘generic labor’’. Indeed, there has been a tendency to increase the decision-making autonomy of educated knowledge workers who have become the most valuable assets for their companies. They are often referred to as ‘‘talent’’. On the other hand, generic workers, as executants of instructions, have continued to proliferate, as many menial tasks can hardly be automated and many workers, particularly youth, women, and immigrants, are ready to accept whatever conditions are necessary to get a job. This dual structure of the labor market is related to the structural conditions of a knowledge economy growing

xxiv	PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

within the context of a large economy of low-skill services, and it is at the source of the growing inequality observed in most societies.

Information and communication technologies have had a powerful effect on the transformation of labor markets and of the work pro- cess. However, their effects have been substantially mediated by the strategies of firms and the policies of governments. Thus, when public support of labor unions provokes businesses to agree on job security in exchange for moderate wage increases, stable jobs are protected, but labor creation dwindles because technology is used to substitute automation for labor. On the other hand, when companies have free rein in labor-hiring practices, they tend to achieve their ideal labor force pattern: talent attracted with high salaries, perks, and a degree of autonomy, in exchange for commitment to the company; automa- tion and off-shoring of the core labor force; and subcontracting of low-level service activities (such as cleaning or maintenance) to sup- pliers specializing in a lowly paid labor force. Thus, there is a wide range of variation of the transformation of labor in the new economy, depending on the level of development, and the institutional environ- ment. In the developing world, the informal economy represents a fundamental component of the labor market. In advanced economies, the public-service sector becomes the refuge of employment for an increasing share of the work force expelled from traditional good- producing sectors. And entrepreneurship and innovation continue to thrive on the margins of the corporate sectors of the economy, increas- ing the numbers of self-employed as technology allows self-reliance in the control of the means of production of knowledge-based services, from the desk-top quality printer to online services. In sum, the occupational structure of our societies has indeed been transformed by new technologies. But the processes and forms of this transforma- tion have been the result of the interaction between technological change, the institutional environment, and the evolution of relation- ships between capital and labor in each specific social context.

III

Perhaps the most apparent social change taking place in the years since this book was first researched is the transformation of com- munication, a trend that I analyzed in chapter 5 of this volume. Because the revolution in communication technologies has intensified in recent years, and because conscious communication is the distinc- tive feature of humans, it is logical that it is in this realm where society has been most profoundly modified.

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxv

Computer networking, open source software (including Internet protocols), and fast development of digital switching and transmis- sion capacity in the telecommunication networks led to the expansion of the Internet after its privatization in the 1990s and to the general- ization of its use in all domains of activity. The Internet is in fact an old technology: it was first deployed in 1969. But it diffused on a large scale 20 years later, because of several factors: regulatory changes; greater bandwidth in telecommunications; diffusion of personal com- puters; user-friendly software programs that made it easy to upload, access, and communicate content (beginning with the World Wide Web server and browser designed by Tim Berners-Lee in 1990); and the rapidly growing social demand for the networking of everything, arising from both the needs of the business world and the public’s desire to build its own communication networks. As a result, the number of Internet users on the planet grew from under 40 million in 1995 to about 1.5 billion in 2009. By 2009 rates of penetration reached more than 60 percent in most developed countries and were increasing at a fast pace in developing countries. Global Internet penetration in 2008 was still at around one-fifth of the world’s population and fewer than 10 percent of Internet users had access to broadband. However, since 2000, the digital divide, measured in terms of access, has been shrinking. The ratio between Internet access in OECD and developing countries fell from 80.6:1 in 1997 to 5.8:1 in 2007. In 2005, almost twice as many new Internet users were added in developing countries as in OECD countries. China is the country with the fastest growth of Internet users, even though the penetration rate remained under 20 percent of the population in 2008. As of July 2008, the number of Internet users in China totaled 253 million, surpassing the United States, with about 223 million users. The OECD countries as a whole had a rate of penetration of around 65 percent of their populations in 2007. Furthermore, given the huge disparity of Internet use between people over 60 years of age and under 30 years of age, the proportion of Internet users will undoubtedly reach near saturation point in developed countries and increase substantially throughout the world as my generation fades away.

From the 1990s onward, another communication revolution took place worldwide: the explosion of wireless communication, with increasing capacity of connectivity and bandwidth in successive gen- erations of mobile phones. This has been the fastest diffusing technol- ogy in the history of communication. In 1991 there were about 16 million wireless phone subscriptions in the world. By July 2008, subscriptions had surpassed 3.4 billion, or about 52 percent of the

xxvi	PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

world population. Using a conservative user-multiplier factor we can safely calculate that over 60 percent of the people on this planet have access to wireless communication in 2009, even if this is highly constrained by income and the uneven deployment of communication infrastructure. Indeed, studies in China, Latin America, and Africa have shown that poor people give high priority to their communica- tion needs and use a substantial proportion of their meager budget to fulfill them. In developed countries, the rate of penetration of wireless subscriptions ranges between 82.4 percent (the US) to 113 percent (Italy or Spain) and is moving toward saturation point. But also, in countries such as Argentina there are more mobile phone subscrip- tions than people.

In the 2000s we have witnessed increasing technological conver- gence between the Internet and wireless communication and multiple applications that distribute communicative capacity throughout wire- less networks, thus multiplying points of access to the Internet. This is particularly important for the developing world because the growth rate of Internet penetration has slowed due to the scarcity of wired telephone lines. In the new model of telecommunications, wireless communication has become the predominant form of communication everywhere, particularly in developing countries. The year 2002 was the first in which the number of wireless subscribers surpassed fixed- line subscribers worldwide. Thus, the ability to connect to the Internet from a wireless device becomes the critical factor for a new wave of Internet diffusion on the planet. This is largely dependent on the building of wireless infrastructure, on new protocols for wireless Internet, and on the diffusion of advanced broadband capacity.

The Internet, the World Wide Web, and wireless communication are not media in the traditional sense. Rather, they are means of interactive communication. However, the boundaries between mass media communication and all other forms of communication are blurring. E-mail is mostly a person-to-person form of communication, even when carbon-copying and mass-mailing are taken into account. But Internet is much broader than that. The World Wide Web is a communication network used to post and exchange documents. These documents can be texts, audios, videos, software programs; literally anything that can be digitized. As a considerable body of evidence has demonstrated, the Internet, and its diverse range of applications, is the communication fabric of our lives, for work, for personal connection, for information, for entertainment, for public services, for politics, and for religion. The Internet is increasingly used to access mass media (television, radio, newspapers), as well as any form of digitized cultural or informational product (films, music,

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxvii

magazines, books, journal articles, databases). The Web has already transformed television. The teenagers interviewed by researchers at the University of Southern California (USC) Annenberg Center for the Digital Future do not even understand the concept of watching tele- vision on someone’s else schedule. They watch entire television pro- grams on their computer screens and, increasingly, on portable devices. So, television continues to be the major mass medium, for the time being, but its delivery and format is being transformed, as its reception becomes individualized. A similar phenomenon has taken place with the print press. All over the world, Internet users under 30 years of age primarily read newspapers on-line. So, although the newspaper remains a mass medium, its delivery platform changes. There is still no clear business model for on-line journalism. Yet, the Internet and digital technologies have transformed the work process of newspapers and the mass media at large. Newspapers have become internally networked organizations globally connected to networks of information on the Internet. In addition, the on-line components of newspapers have induced networking and synergy with other news and media organizations. Newsrooms in the newspaper, television, and radio industries have been transformed by the digitization of news and its relentless global/local processing. So, mass communica- tion in the traditional sense is now also Internet-based communica- tion in both its production and its delivery.

Furthermore, the combination of on-line news with interactive blogging and email, as well as Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feeds from other documents on the Web, have transformed newspapers into a component of a different form of communication: mass self-com- munication. This form of communication has emerged with the devel- opment of the so-called Web 2.0 and Web 3.0, or the cluster of technologies, devices, and applications that support the proliferation of social spaces on the Internet thanks to increased broadband capa- city, open source software, and enhanced computer graphics and interface, including avatar interaction in three-dimensional virtual spaces. The development of horizontal networks of interactive com- munication that connect local and global in chosen time has intensi- fied the pace and broadened the scope of the trend that I identified more than a decade ago: the formation of a multimodal, multichannel system of digital communication that integrates all forms of media. Furthermore, the communicating and information-processing power of the Internet is being distributed in all realms of social life, as the electrical grid and the electrical engine distributed energy in the process of formation of the industrial society. As people have appro- priated new forms of communication, they have built their own

xxviii

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

systems of mass communication, via SMS, blogs, vlogs, podcasts, wikis, and the like. File sharing and peer-to-peer (p2p) networks make the circulation, mixing, and reformatting of any digitized con- tent possible. New forms of mass self-communication have originated from the ingenuity of young users-turned-producers. One example is YouTube, a video-sharing website where individual users, organiza- tions, companies, and governments can upload their own video con- tent. In July 2007, YouTube launched 18 country-specific partner sites and a site specifically designed for mobile telephone users. This made YouTube the largest mass communication medium in the world. Websites emulating YouTube are proliferating on the Internet, includ- ing Ifilm.com, revver.com, and Grouper.com. Tudou.com is one of China’s fastest growing and most popular video-hosting websites. Video streaming is an increasingly popular form of media consump- tion and production. A Pew Internet and American Life Project study found that in December 2007, 48 percent of American users regularly consumed online video, up from 33 percent a year earlier. This trend was more pronounced for users under 30, 70 percent of whom visit on-line video sites.

Thus, YouTube and other user-generated content web sites are means of mass communication. However, they are different from traditional mass media. Anyone can post a video in YouTube, with few restrictions. And the user selects the video she wants to watch and comment on from a huge listing of possibilities. Pressures are of course exercised on free expression on YouTube, particularly legal threats for copyright infringements and government censorship of political content in situations of crisis.

Horizontal networks of communication built around peoples’ initiatives, interests, and desires are multimodal and incorporate many kinds of documents, from photographs (hosted by sites such as Photobucket.com) and large-scale cooperative projects such as Wikipedia (the open source encyclopedia) to music and films (p2p networks based on free software programs such as Kazaa) and social/ political/religious activist networks that combine web-based forums of debate with global feeding of video, audio, and text. Thus, as analyst Jeffrey Cole reported to me, to teenagers who have the ability to generate content and distribute it over the net, it ‘‘is not 15 minutes of fame they care about, it is about 15 megabytes of fame’’.

Social spaces in the Web, building on the pioneering tradition of the virtual communities in the 1980s and overcoming the shortsighted early commercial forms of social space introduced by AOL, have multiplied in content and soared in numbers to form a diverse and widespread virtual society in the Web. MySpace remains the most

xxx	PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

tions and even violent confrontations between leftists and rightists take place in virtual cities; and news stories within Second Life reach the real world through an increasingly attentive corps of media cor- respondents.

Wireless communication has become a delivery platform of choice for many kinds of digitized products, including games, music, images, and news, as well as instant messaging that covers the entire range of human activity, from personal support networks to professional tasks and political mobilizations. Thus the grid of electronic communica- tion overlies everything we do, wherever and whenever we do it. Studies show that the majority of mobile phone calls and messages originate from home, work, and school; the usual locations where people are, often equipped with a fixed phone line. The key feature of wireless communication is not mobility but perpetual connectivity, as a number of studies, including my own, have documented.

There is a growing interpenetration between traditional mass media and the Internet-based communication networks. Mainstream media are using blogs and interactive networks to distribute their content and interact with their audience, mixing vertical and hori- zontal communication modes. But there are many examples in which the traditional media, such as cable TV, are fed by autonomous production of content using the digital capacity to produce and dis- tribute many varieties of content. Thus, the growing interaction between horizontal and vertical networks of communication does not mean that the mainstream media are taking over the new, auton- omous forms of content generation and distribution. It means that there is a process of convergence that gives birth to a new media reality whose contours and effects will ultimately be decided by political and business power struggles, as the owners of the telecom- munication networks position themselves to control access and traffic in favor of their business partners and preferred customers.

The growing interest of corporate media for Internet-based forms of communication recognizes the significance of the rise of a new form of societal communication, the one I have conceptualized as mass self-communication. It is mass communication because it reaches a potentially global audience through p2p networks and Internet connection. It is multimodal, as the digitization of content and advanced social software, often based on open source programs that can be downloaded for free, allows the reformatting of almost any content in almost any form, increasingly distributed via wireless networks. It also is self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many who communicate with many. This is a new communication realm, and ultimately a new medium,

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxxi

whose backbone is made of computer networks, whose language is digital, and whose senders are globally distributed and globally inter- active. True, the medium, even a medium as revolutionary as this one, does not determine the content and effect of its messages. But it has the potential to make possible unlimited diversity and autonomous production of most of the communication flows that construct mean- ing in people’s minds. This is why, observing more than a decade ago the emerging trends of what now has taken shape as a communication revolution, I proposed in the first edition of this book the hypothesis that a new culture is forming, the culture of real virtuality, in which the digitized networks of multimodal communication have become so inclusive of all cultural expressions and personal experiences that they have made virtuality a fundamental dimension of our reality.

IV

All major social changes are ultimately characterized by a transfor- mation of space and time in the human experience. Thus, in this volume I undertook the analysis of these transformations, proposing a theoretical construction on the basis of available research on the subject. More than a decade later, it may be meaningful to evaluate the relevance of such construction in the light of the evolution of the spatial forms of societies around the globe, and of the emergence of new perceptions of time from the standpoint of social practice.

Let us start with space. In this volume I proposed a theory of urbanism in the Information Age based on the distinction between the space of places and the space of flows. This conceptualization has been widely discussed although not always understood, probably due to the obscurity of my formulation. My approach simply states that space is not a tangible reality, just as it is not from the point of view of natural science. It is a concept constructed on the basis of experience. And so, space in society is not the same as space in astrophysics or in quantum mechanics. If we look at space as a social form and a social practice, throughout history space has been the material support of simultaneity in social practice. That is, space defines the time frame of social relationships. This is why cities were born from the concentra- tion of the functions of command and control, of coordination, of exchange of goods and services, of diverse and interactive social life. In fact, cities are, from their onset, communication systems, increas- ing the chances of communication through physical contiguity. I call space of places the space of contiguity. On the other hand, social practices as communication practices also took place at a distance

xxxii

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

through transportation and messaging. With the advent of electrically operated communication technologies, e.g. the telegraph and telephone, some measure of simultaneity was introduced in social relationships at a distance. But it was the development of micro- electronics-based digital communication, advanced telecommunica- tion networks, information systems, and computerized transportation that transformed the spatiality of social interaction by introducing simultaneity, or any chosen time frame, in social practices, regardless of the location of the actors engaged in the communication process. This new form of spatiality is what I conceptualized as the space of flows: the material support of simultaneous social practices commu- nicated at a distance. This involves the production, transmission and processing of flows of information. It also relies on the development of localities as nodes of these communication networks, and the connectivity of activities located in these nodes by fast transportation networks operated by information flows. This analytical perspective may contribute to understanding the extraordinary transformation of spatial forms taking place throughout the world.

Indeed, since the original publication of this volume, the amount of the world’s population living in urban areas has crossed the threshold of over 50 percent. Thus, instead of the end of cities, predicted by futurologists under the conditions of advanced telecommunications that would make spatial concentration of people and activities unne- cessary, we find ourselves in the largest wave of urbanization in the history of humankind. Two-thirds of the population of the planet may be urban by 2030 and three-quarters by mid-century, according to a simple extrapolation of the growth of the current urban population. Advanced communication technologies have allowed greater concen- tration of population in a small number of areas on the planet, from where the rest of the world can be reached by telecommunicated computer networks and fast transportation systems. Yet, the urban form of the network society is historically distinct from past experi- ence. The global process of urbanization that we are experiencing in the early twenty-first century is characterized by the formation of a new spatial architecture made up of global networks connecting major metropolitan regions and their areas of influence. Besides, the networking form of territorial arrangements extends to the intra- metropolitan structure, so that our understanding of contemporary urbanization, as suggested in this volume, should start with the study of these networking dynamics both in the territories that are included in the networks and in the localities excluded from the dominant logic of global spatial integration. A stream of research conducted in the last two decades around the world, led by Peter Hall, William Mitchell,

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxxiii

Michael Dear, Allen Scott, Anna Lee Saxenian, Peter Taylor, Amy Glasmeier, Jennifer Wolch, Stephen Graham, Saskia Sassen, Franc¸ois Ascher, Guido Martinotti, and Doreen Massey, among others, has shown the close interaction between the technological transformation of society and the evolution of its spatial forms. The most important characteristic of this accelerated process of global urbanization is that we are seeing the emergence of a new spatial form that I call the metropolitan region, to indicate that it is metropolitan though it is not a metropolitan area, because usually there are several metropolitan areas included in this spatial unit. The metropolitan region arises from two intertwined processes: extended decentralization from big cities to adjacent areas and interconnection of pre-existing towns whose territories become integrated by new communication capabil- ities. This model of urbanization is at the same time old and new. The metropolitan region is not just a spatial form of unprecedented size in terms of concentration of population and activities. It is a new form because it includes in the same spatial unit both urbanized areas and agricultural land, open space and highly dense residential areas: there are multiple cities in a discontinuous countryside. It is a multicentered metropolis that does not correspond to the traditional separation between central cities and their suburbs. There are nuclei of different sizes and functional importance distributed along a vast expanse of territory following transportation lines. Sometimes, as in the Eur- opean metropolitan regions, but also in California or New York/ New Jersey, these centers are pre-existing cities incorporated in the metropolitan region by fast railway and motorway transportation networks, supplemented with advanced telecommunication networks and computer networks. Sometimes the central city is still the urban core, as in London, Paris, or Barcelona. But often there are no clearly dominant urban centers. For instance, the largest city in the San Francisco Bay Area is not San Francisco but San Jose´, the capital of Silicon Valley. Yet, San Francisco remains the key location for advanced services, while the East Bay includes a major university (Berkeley) and a biotechnology global hub (Emeryville). In other instances, as in Atlanta or in Shanghai, the new centers (North Atlanta, Pudong) are induced by the fast growth of new business services in the metropolitan region. In all cases, the metropolitan region is constituted by a multicentered structure (with different hierarchies between the centers), a decentralization of activities, resi- dence, and services with mixed land uses, and an undefined boundary of functionality that extends the territory of this nameless city to wherever its networks go. In the early twenty-first century the metro- politan regions are a universal urban form. In the United States,

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxxv

The residential suburban sprawl observed by American urban studies in the 1960s and 1970s is no longer the predominant pattern, even in American metropolitan areas. Nowadays we observe a distributed centrality and a multifunctional spatial decentralization process. The key feature is the diffusion and networking of population and activities in the metropolitan region, together with the growth of different centers interconnected according to a hierarchy of specia- lized functions. Why so? What are the reasons for the formation of these metropolitan regions?

The key spatial feature of the network society is the networked connection between the local and the global. The global architecture of global networks connects places selectively, according to their relative value for the network. Recent urban research, as represented by Peter Taylor and the researchers at Loughborough University, demonstrates the importance of the global networking logic for the concentration of activities and population in the metropolitan regions. This is not only to say that these metropolitan regions are connected globally, but that the global networks, and the value that they process, need to operate from nodes in the network. The finan- cial centers in London, Tokyo, or New York have not produced a global financial market made of telecommunicated computer net- works and information systems. The global financial market has restructured and strengthened the places, old and new, from where global capital flows are managed. They are not global cities but global networks that structure and change specific areas of some cities through their connections. After all, much of New York (e.g. Queens), Tokyo (e.g. Kunitachi) and London (be it Hampstead or Brixton) are very local, except for their immigrant populations. The global func- tions of some areas of some cities are determined by their connection to the global networks of value making, financial transactions, man- agerial functions, or otherwise. And from these nodal landing places, through the operation of advanced services, expands the economic and infrastructural foundation of the metropolitan region. So the changing dynamics of networks, and of each specific network, explains the connection to certain places rather than the places explaining the evolution of the networks. The points of connection in this global architecture of networks are the points that attract wealth, power, culture, innovation, and people, innovative or not, to these places. For these places to become nodes of the global net- works they need to rely on a multidimensional infrastructure of connectivity: on air, land, and sea multimodal transportation; on telecommunication networks; on computer networks; on advanced information systems; and on the whole infrastructure of ancillary

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxxvii

decision implementation is a global electronic macro-network, while the network of decision-making and the generation of initiatives, ideas, and innovation is a micro-network operated by face-to-face communication concentrated in certain places. This spatial architec- ture simultaneously explains the concentration of some metropolitan places and network diffusion: the space of places and the space of flows. Once this mechanism is identified, everything else can be explained: concentration of ancillary services, communication infra- structure that develops in one site and not in others, attraction of talent, good living conditions for the creators of value, attractiveness to their would-be immigrant servants, and so on.

Communication infrastructures are decisive components of the process of mega-metropolitanization but they are not the origin of the process. Infrastructure of communication develops because there is something to communicate. It is the functional need that calls for the development of infrastructures. The value-making locales offer greater opportunities and better services, and this offer attracts talented and innovative professionals. And because there is money, there is a thriving market and there are better cultural amenities, educational facilities, and health services, and therefore jobs which are still the main source of urban growth. Since jobs are appealing globally, these metropolitan regions also become the hubs for immi- gration. They develop as multi-ethnic places and establish global connections not only at the level of functional and economic interac- tions, but at the level of interpersonal relations – the networks of cultures, and the networks of people, analytically captured by the concept of transnationalism from below. At the source of the process of metropolitanization, there is the ability to concentrate production of services, finance, technology, market, and people. This creates economies of scale, as in previous forms of urbanization, as well as economies of synergy which are the most important nowadays. Spa- tial economies of synergy mean that being in a place of potential interaction with valuable partners creates the possibility of adding value as a result of the innovation generated by this interaction. Economies of scale can be transformed by information and commu- nication technologies in their spatial logic. Electronic networks allow for the formation of global assembly lines. Software production can be spatially distributed and coordinated by communication networks. On the other hand, economies of synergy still require the spatial concentration of interpersonal interaction because communication operates on a much broader bandwidth than digital communication at a distance. This is why scientific research is still concentrated in campuses around the world while, at the same time, these campuses

xxxviii

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

cannot operate without being networked with the world wide web of science.

Now, the most strategically important observation for an analysis in terms of spatial networks is that these global networks do not have the same geography; they usually do not share the same nodes. The net- work of innovation in information and communication technology, the network of which Silicon Valley is a major node, is not the same as the network of finance, except in that the network of venture capital typically originated from inside the high-technology industry. Political agencies, nationally and internationally, build their own spatial sites and networks of power. The global network of scientific research does not overlap with the networks of technological innovation. That is why so many are surprised by the failures of projects aimed at developing new Silicon Valleys around a new university. Artistic creativity also has its own network, which shifts constantly, depending on fields of arts and movements of fashion. The global criminal economy (accounting for 5 percent of global GDP) is built on its own specific networks with nodes that do not generally coincide with those of finance or techno- logical innovation. The management of drug traffic features places such as Cali, Mexico City, Tijuana, Miami, Bangkok, Kabul, or Amsterdam, most of them secondary nodes for other major networks. Therefore there is a multilayering of global networks in the key strate- gic activities that structure and destructure the planet. When these multilayered networks overlap in some node, when there is a node that belongs to different networks, two major consequences follow. First, economies of synergy between these different networks take place in that node: between financial markets and media businesses; or between academic research and technology development and inno- vation; between politics and media. In addition, because these multi- layered networks land on particular places, and many networks share a node in such places, these localities become mega-nodes: they become switching nodes for the entire global system, connecting various net- works. London and New York are typical cases of this multiple nodal advantage. Boston does not reach the same level because even if it is probably the dominant node in academic research and an important node in technological innovation (particularly in biotechnology), it is only a secondary node in financial networks, and is subsidiary to other nodes in a number of important dimensions of wealth and power. This is also another reason why in China there is a clear differentiation between Beijing and Shanghai in terms of the nodes and the distinct role they play in the global architecture: Beijing focusing on the political, financial, scientific, and technological; Shanghai specializing in financial networks and global trade. These mega-nodes are the

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xxxix

urban dimension of multilayered global networks. To understand the dynamics and meaning of the node we must start with the analysis of the networks, of each one of the different networks, and of their interaction as facilitated by their spatial convergence. However, each mega-node becomes an attractor of capital, labor, and innovation. Here is where the contradictions arise. A mega-node attracts resources and accumulates opportunities to increase wealth and power. At the same time, because it rarely has the institutional existence or the political capacity of autonomous decision-making as a metropolitan region, it can hardly implement policies on behalf of the needs of the local. In the absence of active social demands and social movements the mega-node imposes the logic of the global over the local. The net result of this process is the coexistence of metropolitan dynamism with metropolitan marginality, expressed in the dramatic growth of squat- ter settlements around the world, and in the persistence of urban squalor in the banlieues of Paris or in the American inner cities. There is an increasing contradiction between the space of flows and the space of places. These mega-nodes concentrate more and more wealth, power, and innovation on the planet. At the same time, few people in the world feel identified with the global, cosmopolitan culture that populates the global networks and becomes the worship of the mega-node elites. In contrast, most people feel a strong regional or local identity. Thus global networks integrate certain dimensions of human life and exclude other dimensions. The contradictory relation- ship between meaning and power is manifested by a growing dis- association between what I conceptualized as the space of flows and the space of places. Although there are places in the space of flows and flows in the space of places, cultural and social meaning is defined in place terms, while functionality, wealth, and power are defined in terms of flows. And this is the most fundamental contra- diction emerging in our globalized, urbanized, networked world: in a world constructed around the logic of the space of flows, people make their living in the space of places.

V

Humans experience time in different ways depending on how their lives are structured and practiced. Throughout history time was defined by a sequence of practices and perceptions. But the intervals and pace of the sequence were highly diverse, depending on social organization, technology, culture, and the biological condition of the population.

xl	PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

Organizing time was a mark of the sovereign power of kings and priests. For the common people, time was established by the recur- rence of the sun and the moon, by agricultural cycles, and by the weather seasons that would bring some regular pattern of sequencing into their perception. Solar clocks would offer a level of measure, provided it was sunny, but the parceling of time into small, precise accounting units, such as hours and minutes, had to wait for the advent of mechanical technology. Moreover, as long as there was no need for this precision, the sequence of time was vaguely perceived, as with societies in the Middle Age, for whom fairs marked the coming together of agricultural production and trade, sociability, and festiv- ity. Religious celebrations, often associated with the agricultural cycle, would also provide benchmarks in an otherwise undetermined accumulation of experience that would not go much further than the distinction of day and night and the time of meals, for those who could have more than one meal. Everything changed with the invention of the clock and the industrial age. Production was orga- nized around the control of time, ultimately perfected in the Taylorist factories of Henry Ford and Vladimir Ilitch. Working time defined life time. The strict definition of time became a major tool to discipline society, as the rhythm of everything was counted and valued, and people fought to gain their own time beyond their subdued working time.

Under capitalism, time became money, as the rate of turnover of capital became a paramount form of profit-making. The faster you could secure your return, and the faster you could reinvest it, the greater the profits to be made. Finance became constructed around the sale of monetized time. Credit was based on time. Speed became essential in financial transactions. The more capitalism went global, the more differences in time zones made possible the proliferation of interdependent financial markets to ensure the movement of capital around the clock. And so, a new form of time emerged in the financial markets, characterized by the compression of time to fractions of a second in financial transactions by using powerful computers and advanced telecommunication networks. Furthermore, the future was colonized, packaged, and sold as bets on future valuation, and as options between various future scenarios. Time as sequence was replaced by different trajectories of imagined time that were assigned market values. There was a relentless trend towards the annihilation of time as an orderly sequence, either by compression to the limit or by the blurring of the sequence between different shapes of future events. The clock time of the industrial age is being gradually replaced by what I conceptualized as timeless time: the kind of time that occurs

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xli

when in a given context, such as the network society, there is systemic perturbation in the sequential order of the social practices performed in this context.

I first found the traces of timeless time while analyzing the work- ings of financial networks. But it also appeared in a wide range of social domains, when every time sequence was cancelled or blurred. We can see this in the attempt to control the biological clock of the human body by medical science’s capacity to allow women to con- ceive a child at an age of their choosing, going beyond the limits of their biologically programmed fertility age. Or in professional work, with the end of predictable career patterns, the development of flex- time, and the end of the separation of working time, personal time, and family time, as in the penetration of all time/spaces by wireless communication devices that blur different practices in a simultaneous time frame through the massive habit of multi-tasking. The attempt to annihilate time is also present in our everyday life: everybody rushes to do more in less time, in a trend that has been analyzed as the acceleration of time. This widespread social practice is the conse- quence of organizing our entire life around units of time that deter- mine what we can do within chronological boundaries in separate spaces. To work full time, pick up the kids from school (on a different, often incompatible schedule), do the shopping, take care of domestic chores, and manage the multiple bureaucratic tasks on which daily life depends, we try to be present and on time everywhere by using technology (fast transportation, calls on the run) and pumping up ourselves to the frantic race of everyday life. Because organizations continue to be clock-based but people are increasingly on flex-time and move between different time regimes, multi-tasking and multi- living through acceleration by the means of technology epitomizes the trend to reach timeless time: the social practice that aims at negating sequence to install ourselves in perennial simultaneity and simulta- neous ubiquity. Why do people rush all the time? Because they can beat their time constraints, or so they think. Because the availability of new communication and transportation technologies encourages them to pursue the mirage of transcending time.

War also changed with technology, as the dominant technological powers, weary of the hesitation of their citizens to engage in lengthy, costly wars, aimed to conduct what I called ‘‘Instant Wars’’, using remotely controlled smart bombs and missiles to inflict unbearable damage to the enemy, thus forcing a quick surrender. Of course, such schemes did not work as planned, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have painfully shown. But there was, and still is, the project of compressing war time by using electronically networked military

PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

xliii

fundamental struggle taking place in the network society between the taming of the technological forces unleashed by human ingenuity and our collective submission to the automaton that escaped the control of its creators.

The trends observed in the last decade seem to support the rele- vance of this analysis of the transformation of time, however abstract it appears to be. The process of globalization has accelerated the tempo of production, management, and distribution of goods and services throughout the planet, measuring productivity and competi- tion by shrinking time to the lowest possible level. Global financial markets have invented time-trading derivatives that spiraled out of control and threaten to destroy the economy they were supposed to fuel. The intensification of the exploitation of natural resources, and the refusal to plan their renewable use over time, has shortened the time horizon of our livelihood as a species while extending our life expectancy as individuals. The virtual reality that dominates our experience has cancelled the notion of time, as we live in the ever- present world of our avatars.

And while famines and catastrophes remind us of our vulnerability to biological time, the extraordinary advances of genetic engineering are propelling humans into the illusion of controlling their bodies and regenerating their cells, thus pushing to an indefinite future the ulti- mate time limit of our existence: death.

In the last decade, the struggle over time has set the stage for the fundamental conflict of our society: a new culture of nature against the culture of the annihilation of time, which is tantamount to the canceling of the human adventure.

VI

Theory and research are only as good as their ability to make sense of the observation of their subject matter. The value of social research does not derive only from its coherence, but from its relevance as well. It is not a discourse but an inquiry. This is why throughout this book, with all its limitations, there is a constant attempt to relate the identification of a series of social processes and organizational forms with their role in the constitution of a new form of society: the network society. The continuing investigation of social evolution in the last decade yields a number of findings that directly relate to the analysis presented in this book. Although I did not predict anything, and I will continue not to do so, I believe there is some connection between the phenomena that I considered to be the key components

xliv	PREFACE TO THE 2010 EDITION

of the network society and the trends and social forms that character- ize our world at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The technological revolution, with its two major and interrelated fields, in micro-electronics-based communication technologies and genetic engineering, has continued to accelerate, transforming the material basis of our lives. Networks have become the predominant organizational form of every domain of human activity. Globalization has intensified and diversified. Communication technologies have constructed virtuality as a fundamental dimension of our reality. The space of flows has taken over the logic of the space of places, ushering in a global spatial architecture of interconnected mega-cities, while people continue to find meaning in places and to create their own networks in the space of flows. Timeless time spreads as a mantle of meaninglessness as global environmental consciousness rises in defense of glacial time as a shared practice with our grandchildren. There is a clear echo between the major issues of our society and the analyses written a decade ago in the book you are about to read. If you think that the approach I proposed, in spite of its obvious flaws, relates to your experience, this is all the comfort this author needs to peacefully fade away.

Manuel Castells Santa Monica, California March 2009

Acknowledgments 2000

The volume you have in your hands is a substantially revised edition of this book, originally published in November 1996. The current ver- sion was elaborated and written in the second half of 1999. It aims at integrating important technological, economic, and social developments that took place in the late 1990s, generally confirming the diagnosis and prognosis presented in the first edition. I have not modified the key substantive elements of the overall analysis: mainly because I be- lieve that the core argument still stands as presented, but also because all books are of their time, and must eventually be superseded by the development and rectification of the ideas they contain, as social ex- perience and research add new information and new knowledge. Be- sides updating some of the information, I have corrected a few mistakes and have tried to clarify and strengthen the argument wherever poss- ible.

In so doing, I have benefited from many comments, criticisms, and contributions from around the world, generally expressed in a con- structive and cooperative manner. I cannot do justice to the richness of the debate that this book has engendered, to my great surprise. I just want to express my heartfelt gratitude to readers, reviewers, and critics, who took the time and effort to think about the issues analyzed in these pages. I cannot claim to be aware of all the comments and discussions in a variety of countries and in languages which I do not understand. But, by thanking those institutions and individuals who, by their comments and the debates they organized, have helped me to better understand now the questions I treated in this book, I wish to extend this acknowledgment to all readers, and commentators, wher- ever and whoever they are.

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to a number of

xlvi	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

reviewers whose thoughts have been influential for my own better un- derstanding and for the eventual rectification of some elements of my research. Among them are: Anthony Giddens, Alain Touraine, Anthony Smith, Peter Hall, Benjamin Barber, Roger-Pol Droit, Chris Freeman, Krishan Kumar, Stephen Jones, Frank Webster, Sophie Watson, Stephen Cisler, Felix Stalder, David Lyon, Craig Calhoun, Jeffrey Henderson, Zygmunt Bauman, Jay Ogilvy, Cliff Barney, Mark Williams, Alberto Melucci, Anthony Orum, Tim Jordan, Rowan Ireland, Janet Abu- Lughod, Charles Tilly, Mary Kaldor, Anne Marie Guillemard, Bernard Benhamou, Jose E. Rodriguez Ibanez, Ramon Ramos, Jose Felix Tezanos, Sven-Eric Liedman, Markku Willennius, Andres Ortega, Alberto Catena, and Emilio de Ipola. I wish to thank especially the three colleagues who organized the first presentations of this book, thus launching the debate: Michael Burawoy in Berkeley, Bob Catterall in Oxford, and Ida Susser in New York.

I am also indebted to the numerous academic institutions that in- vited me, in 1996–2000, to submit the research presented in this book to collegial critique, and, especially to all the people who came to my lectures and seminars, and provided their intellectual feedback. This book has been presented and debated, in chronological order, at the University of California at Berkeley; Oxford University; City University of New York, Graduate Center; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Barcelona; Universidad de Sevilla; Universi- dad de Oviedo; Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona; Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk; The Nether- lands Design Institute, Amsterdam; Cambridge University; University College, London; SITRA–Helsinki; Stanford University; Harvard University; Cité des Sciences et de l’Industrie, Paris; Tate Gallery, Lon- don; Universidad de Buenos Aires; Universidad de San Simon, Cochabamba; Universidad de San Andres, La Paz; Centre Européen des Recoversions et Mutations, Luxembourg; University of California at Davis; Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro; Universidade de São Paulo; Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile; University of California at San Diego; Higher School of Eco- nomics, Moscow; and Duke University. I also want to thank the many other institutions and organizations that invited me to share my work with them in these four years, although I was not able to respond to their kind interest.

A special mention goes to my friend and colleague Martin Carnoy of Stanford University: our continuing intellectual interaction is most important for the development and rectification of my thinking. His contribution to the revision of chapter 4 (on work and employment) in volume I has been essential. Also, my friends and colleagues in Bar-

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

xlvii

celona, Marina Subirats and Jordi Borja, have been, as during most of my life, sources of inspiration and healthy criticism.

I also want to thank my family, the main source of my strength. First, my wife, Emma Kiselyova, for her support, love, intelligence, and patience, in the midst of a most strenuous period for both of us, and for her determination in keeping me focused on substance rather than on image-making. My daughter, Nuria, who managed during these years to support her father from a distance, while producing a doctoral dissertation and a second child. My sister, Irene, who never stopped being my critical consciousness. My step-daughter, Lena, who enriched my life with her warmth and sensitivity. My son-in-law, Jose del Rocio Millan, and my brother-in-law, Jose Bailo, with whom I have spent many hours discussing our work and our lives. And last, but certainly not least, the source of joy in my life, my grandchildren Clara, Gabriel, and Sasha.

I also want to acknowledge my copy-editor, Sue Ashton, whose con- tribution has been essential in bringing order and clarity to this book, both in the first and second editions. I also want to thank the editorial, production, and promotion staff of my publisher, Blackwell, and par- ticularly Louise Spencely, Lorna Berrett, Sarah Falkus, Jill Landeryou, Karen Gibson, Nicola Boulton, Joanna Pyke, and their co-workers. Their personal effort for this book has gone way beyond the usual standards of professionalism in the publishing world.

As for my doctors, customary characters of my trilogy’s acknow- ledgments, they have continued to do their remarkable job, keeping me afloat during these critical years. I would like to reiterate my grati- tude to Dr Peter Carroll and to Dr James Davis, both with the Univer- sity of California at San Francisco, Medical Center.

Finally, I wish to express my deep and genuine surprise at the inter- est generated by this very academic book around the world, not only in university circles but in the media, and among people at large. I know this is not so much related to the quality of the book as to the critical importance of the issues I have tried to analyze: we are in a new world, and we need new understanding. To be able to contribute, in all modesty, to the process of construction of such an understand- ing is my only ambition, and the real motivation to continue the work I have undertaken, as long as my strength will allow.

Berkeley, California

January 2000

The author and publishers gratefully acknowledge permission from the following to reproduce copyright material:

xlviii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

The Association of American Geographers: Fig. 6.1 “Largest absolute growth in information flows, 1982 and 1990,” Federal Express data, elaborated by R. L. Michelson and J. O. Wheeler, “The flow of infor- mation in a global economy: the role of the American urban system in 1990,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 84: 1. Copyright © 1994 The Association of American Geographers, Wash- ington DC.

The Association of American Geographers: Fig. 6.2 “Exports of infor- mation from the United States to major world regions and centers,” Federal Express data, 1990, elaborated by R. L. Michelson and J. O. Wheeler, “The flow of information in a global economy: the role of the American urban system in 1990,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 84: 1. Copyright © 1994 The Association of American Geographers, Washington DC.

Business Week: Table 2.10 “Stocks valuation, 1995–1999: the Standard

&Poor 500’s top growth stocks,” Bloomberg Financial Markets, com- piled by Business Week. Copyright © 1999 McGraw Hill, New York.

University of California: Fig. 4.9 “Percentage of working-age Califor- nians employed in ‘traditional’ jobs, 1999.” Copyright © 1999 Uni- versity of California and The Field Institute, San Francisco.

University of California: Fig. 4.10 “Distribution of working-age Cali- fornians by ‘traditional jobs’ status and length of tenure in the job, 1999.” Copyright © 1999 University of California and The Field In- stitute, San Francisco.

University of California Library: Fig. 4.11 “The Japanese labor mar- ket in the postwar period,” Yuko Aoyama, “Locational strategies of Japanese multinational corporations in electronics,” University of California PhD dissertation, elaborated from information from Japan’s Economic Planning Agency, Gaikokujin rodosha to shakai no shinro, 1989, p. 99, fig. 4.1.

CEPII-OFCE: Table 2.3 “Evolution of the productivity of business sectors (% average annual growth rate),” database of the MIMOSA model. Copyright © CEPII-OFCE.

CEPII-OFCE: Table 2.4 “Evolution of productivity in sectors not open to free trade (% average annual growth rate),” database of the MI- MOSA model. Copyright © CEPII-OFCE.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

xlix

The Chinese University Press: Fig. 6.5 “Diagrammatic representation of major nodes and links in the urban region of the Pearl River Delta,” elaborated by E. Woo, “Urban Development,” in Y. M. Yeung and D. K. Y. Chu, Guandong: Survey of a Province Undergoing Rapid Change. Copyright © 1994 Chinese University Press, Hong Kong.

Table 4.29 excerpted from Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, and Economic Policy Institute, The State of Working America 1998–1999. Copyright © 1999 Cornell University. Used by permis- sion of the publisher, Cornell University Press.

Defence Research Establishment Ottawa: Fig. 7.3 “War deaths rela- tive to world population, by decade, 1720–2000,” G. D. Kaye, D. A. Grant and E. J. Emond, Major Armed Conflicts: a Compendium of Interstate and Intrastate Conflict, 1720 to 1985, Report to National Defense, Canada. Copyright © 1985 Operational Research and Analy- sis Establishment, Ottawa.

Economic Policy Institute: Fig. 4.8 “Employment in the temporary help industry in the United States, 1982–1997,” analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data by Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, The State of Working America 1998–99. Copyright © Cornell University Press/Economic Policy Institute, Ithaca and London.

The Economist: Fig. 2.2 “Estimate of evolution of productivity in the United States, 1972–1999 (output per hour),” Bureau of Labor Statis- tics, elaborated by Robert Gordon in “The new economy: work in progress,” in The Economist, pp. 21–4. Copyright © 1999 The Econo- mist, London (24 July). Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

The Economist: Fig. 2.9 “Declining dividends payments,” in “Shares without the other bit” in The Economist, p. 135. Copyright © The Economist, London (20 November). Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

The Economist: Fig. 5.1 “Media sales in 1998 of major media groups,” company reports; Veronis, Suhler and Associates; Zenith Media; War- burg Dillon Read; elaborated by The Economist, 1, p. 62. Copyright © 1999 The Economist, London (11 December). Reprinted by per- mission of the publisher.

The Economist: Fig. 5.2 “Strategic alliances between media groups in Europe, 1999,” Warburg Dillon Read, elaborated by The Economist,

l	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

1, p. 62. Copyright © 1999 The Economist, London (11 December). Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.3 “Index of employment growth by region, 1973–1999;” an earlier version of this figure appeared in Sus- tainable Flexibility, OCDE/GD(97)48; elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni- versity Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.4 “Part-time workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1998;” an earlier version of this figure appeared in Sustainable Flexibility, OCDE/GD(97)48; elabo- rated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.5 “Self-employed workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1993;” an earlier version of this figure appeared in Sustainable Flexibility, OCDE/GD(97)48; elabo- rated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.6 “Temporary workers in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1997;” an earlier version of this figure appeared in Sustainable Flexibility, OCDE/GD(97)48; elabo- rated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.7 “Non-standard forms of employ- ment in employed labor force in OECD countries, 1983–1994;” an earlier version of this figure appeared in Sustainable Flexibility, OCDE/ GD(97)48; elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustain- ing the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Infor- mation Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 4.12 “Annual growth of productivity,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSCONTENTS 2000

li

employment, and earnings in OECD countries, 1984–1998;” data from OECD, compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcom- ing Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Fig. 7.1 “Labor force participation rate (%) for men 55–64 years old in eight countries, 1970–1998,” A. M. Guillemard, “Travailleurs vieillissants et marché du travail en Europe,” Travail et emploi, September 1993, and Martin Carnoy in the forth- coming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Table 4.23 “Employment in manufactur- ing, major countries and regions, 1970–1997 (thousands),” Interna- tional Labor Office, Statistical Yearbook, 1986, 1988, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997; OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 1977–1997 (Paris: OECD, 1998); OECD, Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics, 1962– 1991 (Paris: OECD, 1993), compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni- versity Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Table 4.24 “Employment shares by indus- try/occupation and ethnic/gender group of all workers in the United States, 1960–1998 (percent),” US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1 Percent Sample, US Population Census, 1960, 1970, compiled by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Harvard University Press: Table 4.25 “Information technology spend- ing per worker (1987–1994), employment growth (1987–1994), and unemployment rate (1995) by country,” derived from OECD, Infor- mation Technology Outlook, 1995 (Paris: OECD, 1996, fig. 2.1); employment growth from OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 1974–1994; unemployment rates from OECD, Employment Outlook (July 1996), compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sus- taining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the In- formation Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

lii	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

Harvard University Press: Table 4.26 “Main telephone lines per em- ployee (1986 and 1993) and Internet hosts per 1,000 population (Janu- ary 1996) by country,” ITU Statistical Yearbook, 1995, pp. 270–5; Sam Paltridge, “How competition helps the Internet,” OECD Ob- server, no. 201 (Aug.–Sep.) 1996, p. 201; OECD, Information Tech- nology Outlook, 1995, fig. 3.5, compiled and elaborated by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Fam- ily and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foun- dation.

Harvard University Press: Table 4.27 “Men’s and women’s employ- ment/population ratios, 15–64 years old, 1973–1998 (percent),” OECD, Employment Outlook (July 1996, table A); OECD, Employ- ment Outlook (June 1999, table B), compiled by Martin Carnoy in the forthcoming Sustaining the New Economy: Work, Family and Community in the Information Age, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni- versity Press, Copyright © 2000 by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin: Table 7.2 “Potential lifelong work- ing hours, 1950–1985,” K. Schuldt, “Soziale und ökonomische Gestaltung der Elemente der Lebensarbeitzeit der Werktätigen,” un- published dissertation, p. 43. Copyright © 1990 Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin.

Iwanami Shoten Publishers: Table 4.28 “Percentage of standard work- ers included in the chuki koyo system of Japanese firms,” Masami Nomura, Syushin Koyo. Copyright © 1994 Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo.

International Labour Organization: Fig. 4.2 “Total fertility rates for nationals and foreigners, selected OECD countries,” SOPEMI/OECD, elaborated by P. Stalker, The Work of Strangers: a Survey of Interna- tional Labour Migration. Copyright © 1994 International Labour Organization, Geneva.

Kobe College: Fig. 7.2 “Ratio of hospitalized deaths to total deaths

(%)by year, 1947–1987,” Koichiri Kuroda, “Medicalization of death: changes in site of death in Japan after World War Two,” unpublished research paper, 1990, Department of Inter-cultural Studies, Kobe Col- lege, Hyogo.

MIT Press: Fig. 6.11 “Barcelona: Paseo de Gracia,” Allan Jacobs, Great Streets. Copyright © 1993 MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

liii

MIT Press: Fig. 6.12 “Irvine, California: business complex,” Allan Jacobs, Great Streets. Copyright © 1993 MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Notisum AB: Table 7.3 “Duration and reduction of working time, 1970–1987, ” L. O. Pettersson, “Arbetstider i tolv Lander,” Statens offentliga utrednigar, 53. Copyright © 1989 Notisum AB, Frölunda.

OECD. Table 2.2 “Productivity in the business sector (percentage changes at annual rates),” in Economic Outlook, June. Copyright © 1995 OECD, Paris.

Polity Press: Table 2.6 “Cross-border transactions in bonds and equi- ties, 1970–1996,” IMF 1997, World Economic Outlook. Globaliza- tion: Challenges and Opportunities, Washington, DC, p. 60, compiled by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations, p. 224. Copyright © 1999 Polity/ Stanford University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Polity Press: Table 2.7 “Foreign assets and liabilities as a percentage of total assets and liabilities of commercial banks for selected coun- tries, 1960–1997,” calculated from IMF, International Financial Sta- tistics Yearbook (various years), elaborated by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transfor- mations, p. 227. Copyright © 1999 Polity/Stanford University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Polity Press: Table 2.8 “Direction of world exports, 1965–1995 (per- centage of world total),” calculated from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (various years), elaborated by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transfor- mations, p. 172. Copyright © 1999 Polity/Stanford University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Polity Press: Table 2.9 “Parent corporations and foreign affiliates by area and country, latest available year (number),” UNCTAD, 1997 (World Investment Report: Transnational Corporations, Market Struc- ture and Competition Policy), 1998, compiled by David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transfor- mations, p. 245. Copyright © 1999 Polity/Stanford University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Population Council: Table 4.22 “Foreign resident population in West-

liv	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 2000

ern Europe, 1950–1990,” H. Fassmann and R. Münz, “Patterns and trends of international migration in Western Europe,” Population and Development Review, 18: 3. Copyright © 1992 Population Council, New York.

Routledge: Fig. 2.8 “Share of growth from high-tech sector in the United States, 1986–1998,” US Commerce Department, elaborated by Michael J. Mandel in his article “Meeting the challenge of the new economy,” in Blueprint, Winter, on-line edition. Copyright © 1999 Routledge, London.

Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center: Table 4.17 “Japan: percentage distribution of employment by occupation, 1955–1990,” Statistical Yearbook of Japan. Copyright © 1991 Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center, Tokyo. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Every effort has been made to trace copyright owners. If notified, the publishers will be pleased to rectify any errors or omissions in the above list at the first opportunity.

Acknowledgments 1996

This book has been 12 years in the making while my research and writing tried to catch up with an object of study expanding faster than my working capacity. That I have been able to reach some form of completion, however tentative, is due to the cooperation, help, and support of a number of people and institutions.

My first and deepest expression of gratitude goes to Emma Kiselyova, whose collaboration was essential in obtaining information for sev- eral chapters, in helping with the elaboration of the book, in securing access to languages that I do not know, and in commenting, assessing, and advising on the entire manuscript.

I also want to thank the organizers of four exceptional forums where the main ideas of the book were discussed in depth, and duly rectified, in 1994–5, in the final stage of its elaboration: the special session on this book at the 1994 Meeting of the American Anthropological Asso- ciation, organized by Ida Susser; the Department of Sociology Collo- quium at Berkeley, organized by Loic Wacquant; the international seminar on new world trends organized in Brasilia around Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as he was assuming the presidency of Brazil; and the series of seminars on the book at Tokyo’s Hitotsubashi University, organized by Shujiro Yazawa.

Several colleagues in several countries read carefully the draft of the book, in full or specific chapters, and spent considerable time com- menting on it, leading to substantial and extensive revisions of the text. The mistakes that remain in the book are entirely mine. Many positive contributions are theirs. I want to acknowledge the collegial efforts of Stephen S. Cohen, Martin Carnoy, Alain Touraine, Anthony Giddens, Daniel Bell, Jesus Leal, Shujiro Yazawa, Peter Hall, Chu-joe Hsia, You-tien Hsing, François Bar, Michael Borrus, Harley Shaiken,

lvi	ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1996

Claude Fischer, Nicole Woolsey-Biggart, Bennett Harrison, Anne Marie Guillemard, Richard Nelson, Loic Wacquant, Ida Susser, Fernando Calderon, Roberto Laserna, Alejandro Foxley, John Urry, Guy Benveniste, Katherine Burlen, Vicente Navarro, Dieter Ernst, Padmanabha Gopinath, Franz Lehner, Julia Trilling, Robert Benson, David Lyon and Melvin Kranzberg.

Throughout the past 12 years a number of institutions have consti- tuted the basis for this work. First of all is my intellectual home, the University of California at Berkeley, and more specifically the aca- demic units in which I have worked: the Department of City and Re- gional Planning, the Department of Sociology, the Center for Western European Studies, the Institute of Urban and Regional Development, and the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. They have all helped me, and my research, with their material and institutional support, and in providing the appropriate environment to think, im- agine, dare, investigate, discuss, and write. A key part of this environ- ment, and therefore of my understanding of the world, is the intelligence and openness of graduate students with whom I have been fortunate to interact. Some of them have also been most helpful research assist- ants, whose contribution to this book must be recognized: You-tien Hsing, Roberto Laserna, Yuko Aoyama, Chris Benner, and Sandra Moog. I also wish to acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Kekuei Hasegawa at Hitotsubashi University.

Other institutions in various countries have also provided support to conduct the research presented in this book. By naming them, I extend my gratitude to their directors and to the many colleagues in these institutions who have taught me about what I have written in this book. These are: Instituto de Sociología de Nuevas Tecnologías, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid; International Institute of Labour Studies, International Labour Office, Geneva; Soviet (later Russian) Sociological Association; Institute of Economics and Industrial Engi- neering, Siberian Branch of the USSR (later Russian) Academy of Sci- ences; Universidad Mayor de San Simon, Cochabamba, Bolivia; Instituto de Investigaciónes Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Mexico; Center for Urban Studies, University of Hong Kong; Center for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore; Institute of Technology and International Economy, The State Council, Beijing; National Taiwan University, Taipei; Korean Research Institute for Human Settlement, Seoul; and Faculty of Social Studies, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo.

I reserve a special mention for John Davey, Blackwell’s editorial director, whose intellectual interaction and helpful criticism over more than 20 years have been precious for the development of my writing,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 1996

lvii

helping me out of frequent dead ends by constantly reminding me that books are about communicating ideas, not about printing words.

Last but not least, I want to thank my surgeon, Dr Lawrence Werboff, and my physician, Dr James Davis, both of the University of Califor- nia at San Francisco’s Mount Zion Hospital, whose care and profes- sionalism gave me the time and energy to finish this book, and maybe others.

Berkeley, California

March 1996